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Continued critiques, evidence and newer reform trends have increasingly contested the use of 16 
market-centered models–the competition prescription–for urban public space maintenance as well 17 
as other local services. This article adopts a contextualized contingency perspective on the 18 
competition prescription and questions the contested status of market-centered models in a survey-19 
based study of the current use of and satisfaction with private providers for maintenance of 20 
parks/greenspaces and road/streets in Scandinavian local governments. The study finds widespread 21 
use of and satisfaction with private providers. However, satisfaction depends on national context 22 
and multiple contingencies. The study challenges the contested status of market-centered models, 23 
highlights that different models serve different strategic objectives, and directs attention to 24 
discussions of context and key contingencies that define how well market-centered models perform.  25 




Most local governments hold responsibilities for the provision of urban public space such as parks, 28 
greenspaces, squares and roads/streets to serve a diverse range of local needs and uses distributed 29 
across a number of stakeholders and interests (Carmona 2010). Undertaking of maintenance 30 
operations is critical for upholding attractive and functional public spaces within the urban fabric–or 31 
at least for upholding standards and meeting expectations outlined or agreed upon by the involved 32 
stakeholders (Dempsey and Burton 2012; Lindholst et al. 2015). Under the influx of wider reform 33 
pushes, neoliberal politics and national policies many local governments have since the 1980s 34 
challenged and increasingly shifted away from traditional state-centered models for organizing 35 
maintenance responsibilities through the introduction of market-centered management models 36 
(Carmona, De Magalhães, and Hammond, 2008; De Magalhães and Carmona, 2006; Lindholst 37 
2020; Randrup, Lindholst, and Dempsey, 2020). A key assumption for the shift has been the general 38 
idea inherent in the new public management (NPM) reform agenda that governments can improve 39 
performance of service delivery by capitalizing on competitive markets (e.g., Dehoog 1990; Hood 40 
1991; Walsh 1995)–an idea that Kettl (1993) labelled the “competition prescription.” 41 
However, discussions in the literature and evidence have increasingly contested the use of 42 
traditional market-centered models and the underlying rationale of the competition prescription. On 43 
the one hand, multiple studies find that the introduction of market-centered models for organizing 44 
maintenance of public space in several national contexts has resulted in substantial cost savings 45 
(Lindholst 2017). On the other hand, the literature delivers a substantial critique by highlighting that 46 
market-centered models have led to substantial losses of social and recreational qualities (e.g., 47 
Dempsey and Burton 2012; Jones 2000) and are likely to produce ‘vicious cycles’ with multiple 48 
negative outcomes (Randrup et al. 2020). Furthermore, some research indicates that salient 49 
outcomes across local governments present a diverse and multi-dimensional mix of negative and 50 
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positive outcomes, the balance of which is only poorly understood (Lindholst et al. 2017). Critiques 51 
of traditional market-centered models have also called attention to and raised hopes for newer ideas 52 
of partnerships and collaboration as alternative approaches for organizing market-centered models 53 
within public space management (e.g., Lindholst 2009; Randrup et al. 2020) and beyond (e.g., 54 
Donahue and Zeckhauser 2012; Vincent-Jones 2007). More broadly, critiques of market-centered 55 
models and developments within some local services have raised discussions about whether a new 56 
shift toward re-municipalization is emerging and replacing the movement toward market-centered 57 
models seen in the 1980s and 1990s (Clifton et al. 2019; Wollmann and Marcou 2010; Wollmann, 58 
Koprić, and Marcou, 2016). Finally, these discussions are connected to critiques and dismissal of 59 
the NPM and a shift in reform orientation toward other and newer models (e.g., Christensen and 60 
Lægreid 2017; Dunleavy et al. 2006). Some research, however, finds that local governments’ choice 61 
of service provider are balanced over time and based on a pragmatism mainly driven by 62 
(dis)satisfaction with cost and quality levels of incumbent service providers (Kim and Warner 2016; 63 
Warner and Aldag 2019). In light of such discussions and developments, research has been called 64 
for that tries to understand better the contexts and contingencies under which different market-65 
centered models lead to more favorable outcomes (Lindholst 2017). Such calls bring attention to a 66 
multitude of arguments beyond economic reasoning that contribute to our understanding of 67 
variations in outcomes. Notably, the literature has harnessed multiple arguments rooted in a mix of 68 
economic, contractual, sociological and administrative-organizational reasoning to highlight 69 
contingencies with a likely bearing on variations in the performance of market-centered models 70 
(Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Donahue 1989; Fernandez 2009; Kettl 1993; Kuhlmann and 71 
Wollmann 2019; Lamothe and Lamothe 2010; Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock 2008; Lindholst, 72 
Petersen, and Houlberg 2020; Warner 2006).  73 
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This article contributes to discussions in the literature on the contested status of market-centered 74 
models for public space management by developing a contextualized contingency perspective and 75 
providing an empirical test of implications in a study of Scandinavian local managers’ satisfaction 76 
with the performance of private providers engaged for maintaining local parks/green spaces and 77 
streets/roads. The study relies upon comparable survey-data collected in 2014–16 from managers 78 
with responsibilities for local parks/green spaces and streets/roads in Scandinavian local 79 
governments. The design enables a study that across three country contexts tests 1) whether local 80 
managers are more satisfied than dissatisfied with private provider performance, and 2) the national, 81 
managerial and urban contingencies upon which local managers’ satisfaction are likely to depend. 82 
Altogether eight hypotheses guide the study.  83 
The first part of the article outlines the background and theoretical arguments on the 84 
performance of market-centered models for organizing maintenance services, and provides a set of 85 
arguments on why local managers’ satisfaction with private provider performance varies. The 86 
second part describes the study’s methods and data. The third part presents results, discusses 87 
implications and draws up conclusions.  88 
 89 
Background: A contested status of market-centered models?  90 
The study’s service context–public space–has, from an urban planning perspective, long been 91 
viewed as vital for the attractiveness of cities and the quality of human life in self-reinforcing urban 92 
environments where “liveliness and variety attract more liveliness; deadness and monotony repel 93 
life” (Jacobs 1961, p. 129). In the classical terminology for different types of goods based on the 94 
two dimensions of rivalry in consumption and exclusiveness of use (Samuelson 1954), public 95 
spaces can be argued to resemble a “public” or “collective” good. For example, in practice it would 96 
be difficult (or very radical) to exclude local residents or visitors from using or benefiting from 97 
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these services, and the use by one user is to a certain extent non-rival for the use by other users. 98 
Given the (need for) non-exclusiveness, economic reasoning suggests that the use of market-centered 99 
models for delivering public space should ideally take place on the supply (production) side rather than 100 
the demand (consumer) side. From a welfare perspective, the risk for under-supply of public goods 101 
under a complete market-model also suggests that responsibilities for finance and availability should be 102 
in the hands of local government. In theory, decentralization of responsibilities to local governments 103 
should warrant a better match between local preferences, allocation of financing and availability of 104 
services (Warner 2006).  105 
Research finds that services associated with maintenance of the physical infrastructures that 106 
constitute urban public spaces, such as parks and streets, represent a set of comparatively well-107 
suited characteristics for implementation of market-centered models. Survey-based research from 108 
the US, for example, indicates that local managers find that the provision of services related to 109 
maintenance of public spaces, on average, is characterized by a relative ease of specifying and 110 
monitoring services, and represents a context where competition is relatively high (Hefetz and 111 
Warner 2012). The literature often contrasts these characteristics with social services, where 112 
competition is scarcer and services are argued to be harder to specify and monitor (Hansen 2010; 113 
Lamothe and Lamothe, 2010; Van Slyke 2003). However, such assessments are qualified by the 114 
fact that the requirements of commonly used market-centered models for maintenance services 115 
often rely on technical ‘conformance-to-specification’ definitions of quality that are not necessarily 116 
linked to the requirements for aligning public space qualities with expectations of excellence, 117 
shifting circumstances, or the needs and demands of multiple stakeholders (Lindholst et al. 2015). A 118 
review of studies addressing the outcomes from the use of market-centered models for park and 119 
green space maintenance finds that most studies report various positive economic outcomes such as 120 
cost savings and improved cost-effectiveness, while other reported outcomes related to services, the 121 
organization or staff tend to be negative (Lindholst 2017). The range of negative outcomes is in 122 
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particular voiced in critiques of the use of market-centered models in the context of UK experiences 123 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Dempsey, Burton, and Selin 2016; Hebbert 2008; Jones 2000). Hebbert 124 
(2008), for example, notes that the very radical UK policy regimen of compulsory competitive 125 
tendering (CCT) enacted in the 1980s and 1990s reduced “the ancient art of urban horticulture” to 126 
“mechanical crudity” and let genuine urban green spaces deteriorate into “ghost zones” and “green 127 
deserts” empty of social and recreational functions. Thus, these critiques suggest that public spaces 128 
to some degree stop being fit for purpose when (too) radical market-centered models are applied. 129 
Others associate such critiques more broadly with the combination of market-centered models with 130 
overly competitive and cost-focused approaches. The combination is argued to lead to ‘vicious 131 
circles’ where self-reinforcing dynamics return a pool of diminished organizational resources, poor 132 
working conditions, faulty performance of maintenance operations, loss of quality, increased 133 
monitoring activities, and a lack of development and innovation (Randrup et al. 2020). Similar 134 
dynamics and negative outcomes are observed in other service contexts where, for example, the use 135 
of private providers–while superficially technically efficient–is less apt to promote outcomes related 136 
to local equity and democracy than the alternatives (Hebdon 1995; Warner and Hefetz 2002). Such 137 
dynamics can be interpreted as broad manifestations of the “quality shading” hypothesis (Hart, 138 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997) and/or as different kinds of “negative externalities” (Boyne 1998). Some 139 
research simply suggests that private provision is “cheap and dirty” (Elkomy, Cookson, and Jones 140 
2019). Congruently, research in the context of local public spaces finds that the overall balance of 141 
managers’ views on the outcomes from the use of market-centered models corresponds to a diverse 142 
and multi-dimensional mix of positive and negative outcomes (Lindholst et al. 2017). Thus, the 143 
comparatively well-suited characteristics of maintenance services do not appear to be sufficient 144 
conditions for an uncontested use of market-centered models in the context of public space 145 
management.  146 
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 The findings echo insights from reviews of the general research on the outcomes from the use of 147 
market-centered models and involvement of private providers in the public sector–in particular by 148 
contracting out (Boyne 1998; Bel, Fagada, and Warner 2010; Hodge 2000; Petersen, Hjelmar, and 149 
Vrangbæk, 2018; Vrangbæk, Petersen, and Hjelmar 2015). The reviews highlight that evidence is 150 
far more abundant for financial and partly service performance criteria than for other criteria, and 151 
that performance appears to depend on various contingencies such as reform history, and service 152 
and country context. One key finding is that the reported returns, i.e., cost savings, from recurrent 153 
competition are diminishing over time (e.g., Hodge 2000) or even that private production is not 154 
cheaper than public production (Bel, Fagada, and Warner 2010). On the one hand, this is apparently 155 
challenging key reform objectives for using market-centered models. On the other hand, this finding 156 
is congruent with theoretical reasoning that suggests that differences in cost levels are likely to 157 
diminish over time as competitive contexts spur both learning and searches for innovation equally 158 
within the private and public sectors (Vining and Boardman 1992). Consequently–and after several 159 
decades with market-inspired public sector reforms–it makes sense to apply multiple and more 160 
context-sensitive performance criteria rather than impose a global evaluation criteria for cost levels 161 
alone (e.g., Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright 2007; 2014; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; 162 
Lindholst et al. 2017). Empirical findings also warrant such complementary shifts in criteria. A 163 
study from the 2010s (Lindholst et al. 2017) suggests that economic accountability–such as the 164 
ability to deliver services at the ‘market price’ or demonstrate transparency for cost levels and unit 165 
prices–rather than costs reduction is the most salient economic outcome from contracting out 166 
maintenance of local public spaces for managers in a Scandinavian context. Similarly, Warner and 167 
Aldag (2019) highlights the importance of focusing on local performance criteria by concluding that 168 
managerial satisfaction with price and quality is driving shifts between in-house and private 169 
provisions.  170 
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This study addresses these concurrent discussions in the literature by shifting attention to local 171 
managers’ satisfaction with private providers against multiple performance criteria and highlighting 172 
key conditions and contexts, i.e., contingencies, under which market-centered models are likely to 173 
become more or less contested.  174 
 175 
Theory: A contingency approach 176 
The following section develops a contingency approach to account for variations in the satisfaction 177 
with private provider performance–the performance of the competition prescription–with attention 178 
to the characteristics of the national and service context(s) of the study. The account expands and 179 
combines earlier literature (e.g., Donahue 1989; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Kettl 1993; 180 
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019; Lamothe and Lamothe 2008; Walsh 1995; Warner 2006) and links 181 
variations to differences in country characteristics, competitive environments, characteristics of 182 
contract-based exchange relations, organizational capacities and the urban context. The account 183 
offers eight testable hypotheses.   184 
  185 
Country context 186 
Comparative research points out that the implementation and outcomes from various reforms and 187 
management models depend on a variety of contextual characteristics at the country level 188 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019). Christensen and Lægreid (2011), 189 
for example, highlight that contextual differences across groups of countries (and services) in 190 
structures (e.g., legal constitutions and politico-administrative systems), cultures (e.g., history and 191 
traditions), and environments (e.g., institutional and technical) are likely to produce divergence. The 192 
study integrates a comparative perspective in the context of the three Scandinavian countries of 193 
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Denmark, Norway and Sweden–three OECD countries renowned for their highly developed 194 
economies, well-functioning politico-administrative structures and large tax-financed public sectors 195 
(Greve, Lægreid, and Rykkja 2016). With a point of departure in a Scandinavian context, the study 196 
is able to examine the importance of contextual differences at the country level given that the three 197 
countries represent a mix of similarities and differences with a bearing on the performance of 198 
market-centered models. Table 1 summarizes key similarities and differences.  199 
 200 
*** Table 1 **** 201 
 202 
In a comparative perspective, Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2019) highlight that the Scandinavian 203 
countries belong to the same administrative tradition. In the consensus and decentralized 204 
democracies of Scandinavia, most national governments have been coalitions or minority-based and 205 
highly dependent on securing a wider parliamentary consensus across several, and sometimes 206 
opposing, political parties and interests for producing new legislation, policies, and reforms 207 
(Lijphart 2012). Local governments in Scandinavia also have a comparatively high degree of 208 
autonomy and competencies vis-à-vis the central government in terms of, for example, the level and 209 
organization of services (Ladner et al. 2016). Thus, in comparison with majoritarian democracies, 210 
central governments in Scandinavia are limited in their powers to implement (if desired) radical and 211 
comprehensive reforms. More generally, public sector reforms in Scandinavia since the 1980s have 212 
emphasized modernization more than marketization, and retained a dominant role of the state by 213 
integration of newer reform features into the classical Weberian bureaucracy–an integration often 214 
viewed as an expression of a “neo-Weberian state” (NWS) model (Greve et al. 2016). Thus, 215 
markets and private providers are delegated a more limited role in reforms than in the more 216 
wholesale neoliberal state models and radical NPM reforms tried out in Anglo-Saxon countries 217 
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(Christensen and Lægreid 2017). In addition, the legal-regulatory frameworks for the use of market-218 
centered models are relatively similar and well-established in the three countries due to 219 
requirements for compliance with EU-law. However, EU-law only regulates procedures for 220 
involving private providers, i.e., how to use the market, and does not regulate whether local 221 
governments should use the market or not. Overall, these features imply that Scandinavian local 222 
governments are delegated substantial degrees of freedom for a pragmatic adaptation of market-223 
centered models to local circumstances and for combining the use with (modernized forms for) 224 
state-centered models or other alternatives. Thus, time and space have allowed for decentralized 225 
sectorial dynamics to take hold within and across local governments and private providers where 226 
gradual and mutual learning and development of required capacities can occur. Congruent with 227 
these characteristics, research finds that reform trajectories within local park and road services since 228 
the 1980s and onward have been of an incremental and pragmatic character (Lindholst, 2020). 229 
Combining the arguments on the relatively well-suited service characteristics and the decade-long 230 
pragmatic reform approach in Scandinavia suggests that local managers primarily use market-231 
centered models where the overall balance between pros and cons are favorable. The following 232 
hypothesis tests the argument:  233 
 234 
H1 – Local managers in Scandinavia are–on average–more satisfied than dissatisfied with 235 
private provider performance.  236 
 237 
However, the territorial and administrative preconditions for the use of market-centered models 238 
differ remarkably across Scandinavia (Table 1). Denmark is a relatively small and densely 239 
populated country with a politico-administrative structure based on relatively few and large lower-240 
tier local governments. In contrast, Norway is a sparsely populated country with many small local 241 
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governments scattered across a vast geography and with a greater role for higher-level government 242 
bodies. In correspondence with earlier research (Bel and Fageda 2011; Foged 2016; Lamothe, 243 
Lamothe, and Feiock 2008; Warner 2006), these characteristics suggest that Denmark represents 244 
comparatively better preconditions in which stronger, more attractive and competitive markets can 245 
evolve alongside with the development of internal capacities for the use of market-centered models. 246 
Likewise, a comparison of the general characteristics suggests that Norway represents preconditions 247 
that are the most challenging, characterized by a highly fragmented and geographically scattered 248 
market structure with relatively unattractive small contracts, while Sweden takes up a middle 249 
position in Scandinavia. In sum, the arguments suggest that the differences in country context are 250 
likely to have an impact on how well market-centered models perform. A key difference in 251 
Scandinavia is the degree to which territorial and administrative structures support market-centered 252 
models. Thus, the use of market-centered models are expected to be more contested in Norway (in 253 
particular) and Sweden than in Denmark. The following hypothesis tests the arguments in the 254 
context of Scandinavia:  255 
 256 
H2 – In comparison to Norway and Sweden, the country context of Denmark is associated 257 
with higher satisfaction with private provider performance. 258 
 259 
Competitive environments 260 
Market theory and economic reasoning routinely highlight a combination of price-based 261 
competition, user choice (consumer sovereignty), profit-based incentive structures, and gains from 262 
economies of scale as key mechanisms for explanation of why market-based models and 263 
involvement of private providers should (in theory) result in superior performance in terms of 264 
technical and allocative efficiencies (Boyne 1998; Vining and Weimer 2007). A core proposition in 265 
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the traditional argument is the idea that establishment of competitive markets for contracts, where 266 
governments can freely choose between alternative providers based on evaluation of price and/or 267 
quality, gives providers a strong incentive to ensure cost-efficient service provision, and public 268 
authorities an option to replace incompetent or failing providers (Dehoog 1990; Donahue 1989; 269 
Walsh 1995). Similarly, common performance expectations of market-centered models in public 270 
policies include a mix of key criteria related to service quality, costs levels and responsiveness 271 
(Boyne 2002; Le Grand 2007; Warner and Aldag 2019). 272 
Some arguments also suggest that competition can be detrimental to performance and its benefits 273 
can be outweighed if a change of provider(s) disrupts stability of relations, damages coordination, 274 
implies loss of knowledge and requires new learning (Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Lamothe and 275 
Lamothe 2010). Managing processes of competitive tendering may also incur increased transaction 276 
cost for local governments (Kettl 1993). Economic reasoning also points out that the presence of 277 
increasingly higher switching costs, i.e., the costs of replacing an incumbent provider, limits 278 
competition and transforms exchange relations (contracts) into bilateral monopolies with adverse 279 
consequences for performance (Williamson 1979). Thus, the positive association between 280 
competition and performance is likely to be rooted in the realistic possibility for replacement–as 281 
reflected in Baumol’s argument on contestability (1982), and classical economic reasoning on 282 
competition (Abbott 1955)–rather than recurrent disruptions of service delivery through use of 283 
competitive tendering and change of service providers. The arguments suggest that the contested 284 
status of market-oriented models is partly explained by the strength of the competitive environment. 285 
The following hypothesis tests the arguments.  286 
 287 
H3 – A stronger (weaker) competitive environment is associated with greater (lesser) 288 




Contract-based exchange relations 291 
Market-centered management models rely heavily on formal contract-based exchange relations 292 
(Donahue 1989; Vincent-Jones 2007; Walsh 1995). According to traditional contract theory, the 293 
logic in the standard approach to contracting out–also designated the ‘competition model’–seeks to 294 
align formal contract features with the purpose of driving costs down by maximizing price 295 
competition, i.e., ensuring technical efficiency, as well as ensuring accountability by specifying and 296 
safeguarding the exchange (Dehoog 1990; Macneil 1980; Schepker et al. 2014). In a risk 297 
perspective (Marques and Berg 2011), the standard contract should ideally be able to minimize 298 
production costs by providing planning foresight and allocating a minimum of risk to the private 299 
provider. However, the overall welfare benefit and outcomes from this approach hinge on whether 300 
maintenance operations contribute to keeping public spaces fit for purpose within the urban fabric 301 
(e.g., Dempsey and Burton 2012; Lindholst et al. 2015). Key contract features in the standard model 302 
for maintenance services related to green spaces/parks and roads/streets usually include juridical 303 
parts, formal specification of services with reference to a set of performance- and instruction-based 304 
measures, a work schedule, a payment scheme, and provision for subsequent monitoring and 305 
sanctions (Lindholst 2009). The standard contract also commonly links ex post payments calculated 306 
on a regular (e.g., monthly) basis for work carried out in fixed work schedules and ad hoc work.  307 
The standard model presumes that public authorities can, to a large extent, determine the “what,” 308 
“where” and “when,” and can foresee the key requirements and conditions of an exchange (i.e., 309 
maintenance operations) in advance (by ex ante planning) and specify them in a formal contract for 310 
a given duration of time. Subsequently, the contract forms the basis for holding providers 311 
accountable for provision of maintenance operations as agreed upon through the specification and 312 
monitoring of services and provisions for penalties and sanctions. Thus the reliance on standard 313 
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contract features within an exchange relation reflects typical recommendations in economic 314 
reasoning and should in principle minimize the quality-shading problem (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 315 
1997). Overall, the level of contract completeness, i.e., the level of formal specification in the 316 
contract and the inclusion of relevant information for addressing contingencies and allocating risks 317 
between the contract parties, becomes important for accurate contract pricing and effective use of 318 
competition, reduction of uncertainties and minimizing the risks for later conflicts between the 319 
contracting parties (Walker and Davis 1999). These arguments suggest that the contested status of 320 
market-centered models partly depends on the degree to which local governments rely on standard 321 
contract features in their exchange relations with private providers. The following hypothesis tests 322 
the arguments:  323 
 324 
H4 – Stronger (weaker) reliance on standard contract features is associated with higher 325 
(lower) satisfaction with private provider performance.  326 
 327 
More broadly, the ideologically-informed reform push toward market-centered models in the 328 
1980s and 1990s appears increasingly contested and replaced in the 2000s and 2010s with 329 
pragmatism among local governments where dissatisfaction with private (or other) providers in 330 
terms of cost and quality brings attention to alternatives and drives shifts between these (Bel et al. 331 
2018; Clifton et al. 2019). One alternative discussed in the literature is the shift back to state-332 
centered models where responsibilities across multiple services are reorganized anew within local 333 
governments (Clifton et al. 2019; Wollmann et al. 2016). However, newer alternatives within public 334 
space management also include social enterprises (Muñoz 2010), community-centered models 335 
(Mathers, Dempsey, and Molin 2015), long-term public-private partnerships (Dempsey, Velarde, 336 
and Burton 2020), and cross-sectoral partnerships (Dempsey et al. 2016). Interestingly, critiques of 337 
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cost-focused and standard market-centered models also prompt hopes for partnership-based and 338 
collaborative contracting models as better alternatives for engaging private providers within public 339 
space management (Carmona et al. 2008; Dempsey and Burton 2012; Jones 2000), as well as more 340 
broadly in the public sector (Bovaird 2004; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2012; Entwistle and Martin 341 
2005; Vincent-Jones 2007). This development corresponds with contemporary contract theory, 342 
which also emphasizes the formal contract as an important supportive mechanism for the adaptation 343 
and coordination of activities within an ongoing exchange relation (Schepker et al. 2014; Vincent-344 
Jones 2007). Commonly, market-centered models for partnership and collaborative models within 345 
public space management include a strategic focus on service development, flexibility, and multiple 346 
objectives, and rely on additional contract features such as formalized structures for joint planning 347 
and collaboration combined with supportive economic incentives, inclusion of a broader range of 348 
stakeholders, and requirements for partners to bring in a broader knowledge-base and set of 349 
professional skills (Lindholst 2009). These models should therefore be better able to keep public 350 
spaces fit for purpose in the urban fabric, i.e., ensure allocative efficiency, when circumstances and 351 
requirements are more uncertain and demand ongoing adjustment and development of services 352 
(e.g., Dempsey and Burton 2012; Lindholst et al. 2015). Thus, from a risk perspective (Marques and 353 
Berg 2011), these models should reduce the risk for service provisions that are unaligned with the 354 
preferences on the demand side (i.e., users) and for the pursuit of short-term interests at the expense 355 
of long-term concerns. On the downside, partnership and collaborative models may allocate a 356 
greater amount of risk (e.g., by increasing future uncertainty of what, when and where for 357 
maintenance operations) to the private partner and thereby run the risk of incurring additional costs 358 
/ increasing prices. However, pragmatic managers (Kim and Warner 2016) should be able to 359 
balance the overall pros and cons and design their maintenance contracts to fit their purpose.  360 
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Sociological reasoning on exchange relations highlights the limitations of formal contracts more 361 
generally and brings attention to the importance of supportive collaborative norms and behaviors 362 
for effective coordination within contract-based relationships (Amirkhanyan et al. 2010; Macneil 363 
1980; Vincent-Jones 2000; 2007). A collaborative orientation in attitudes and behaviors within a 364 
relationship is argued to enhance key requirements for effective contracting such as communication 365 
and sharing of information, minimization of misunderstanding and provision of a helpful 366 
environment for fixing unforeseen problems ‘ad hoc’ as they arise. Thus, a collaborative quality in 367 
exchange relations assists in filling in the gaps in the formal contact setup and helps partners to 368 
achieve mutually satisfying outcomes. A collaborative relationship may also reduce transaction 369 
costs associated with monitoring, dispute settlements and sanctioning of the contract (Brown, 370 
Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006). The literature also argues that there is a ‘darker side’ of partnerships 371 
and collaborative relations. For example, long-standing exchange relations might succumb to inertia 372 
or ‘corruption’ and undermine sound competition and the consideration of alternative providers 373 
(Bovaird 2004; Walker and Davis 1999). However, these darker sides appear to be marginal or 374 
‘conditional limits’ to a general positive link between partnerships and collaboration and 375 
performance (Poppo, Zheu, and Zenger 2008). In light of these arguments, parts of the contested 376 
status can be argued to depend on the degree to which local governments develop respectively 377 
formal partnership features and a collaborative quality within their exchange relations. The two 378 
following hypotheses test the arguments:  379 
 380 
H5 – Stronger (weaker) reliance on formal partnership contract features is associated with 381 




H6 – A stronger (weaker) collaborative quality of exchange relationships is associated with 384 
higher (lower) satisfaction with private provider performance. 385 
 386 
Administrative-organizational capacity 387 
Discussions in the literature suggest that use of market-centered models tends to fragment local 388 
governance structures and reduces the administrative-organizational capacity to govern public space 389 
in accordance with long-term interests and community needs (De Magalhães and Carmona 2006; 390 
Dempsey and Burton 2012). More broadly, the use of market-centered models is argued to ‘hollow 391 
out’ the capacity to govern due to internal loss of knowledge and resources and the transfer of these 392 
to the private sector (Milward and Provan 2000)–a loss that risks undermining the organizational 393 
requirements of market-centered models themselves (O’Flynn and Alford 2008). Also, politicians 394 
and high-level managers eager to reduce overall expenditures may overlook the importance of 395 
internal capacity and thus allocate insufficient resources for internal management (Van Slyke 2003). 396 
However, the implementation and use of market-centered models involves learning and 397 
development of internal contract management capacity, including the ability to address questions of 398 
“what to buy,” “whom to buy from” and “what is bought” (Kettl 1993; 2010). The general levers 399 
for these abilities relate to multiple administrative-organizational characteristics of public 400 
bureaucracies, including the administrative infrastructure and technology, leadership and the 401 
elaboration of priorities, the coordination and alignment of activities into coherent wholes, and 402 
supportive management systems (Andrews and Entwistle 2015; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 403 
2003). Combined, these arguments suggest that the contested status depends on the degree to which 404 
local governments’ develop their internal capacity for managing services through market-centered 405 




H7 – Stronger (weaker) internal contract management capacity is associated with higher 408 
(lower) satisfaction with private provider performance. 409 
 410 
Urban complexity 411 
Parts of the privatization literature (e.g., Warner 2006) suggest that urbanized environments with 412 
larger and more diverse populations provide a more challenging environment for market-centered 413 
models. Similarly, the planning literature suggests that more populated and diverse urban settings 414 
represent more complicated, dynamic and unpredictable environments for maintenance operations 415 
in public spaces (e.g., De Magalhães and Carmona 2006). For example, a greater number of 416 
residents and visitors, and a more diverse and varied use of public space make it harder (and more 417 
expensive) to schedule and provide maintenance in accordance with performance- and instruction-418 
based specifications. A provider must be capable of adapting or postponing operations on a day-to-419 
day basis and rely less on standard routines with a fixed number of monthly and weekly 420 
maintenance operations. For example, it might be impossible to carry out planned routine 421 
maintenance operations if a public space is used for informal social events. Grass maintenance 422 
might also be impossible or require rescheduling due to a high number of visitors on sunnier days or 423 
if a park unexpectedly needs litter collection. Within a given economy, a provider’s operational 424 
capacity is usually limited, and maintenance operations under more dynamic and complex 425 
circumstances are more likely to be delayed or temporarily insufficient. Consequently, satisfaction 426 
with quality and responsiveness suffers. The following hypothesis tests the argument:  427 
 428 
H8 – A more (less) complex urban environment is associated with lower (higher) 429 




Methods and data 432 
Survey  433 
The study’s empirical parts rely on items and quantitative data from a web-based survey 434 
administered to midlevel managers in all local governments in Scandinavia in 2014-2016. The 435 
survey took place as part of a comparative research project assessing experiences with local 436 
governments’ use of private and public delivery of park and road services. In the study’s context, 437 
the survey delivers unique comparable data for variables across three countries where no other 438 
comparable data sources exist. Given that the survey data are cross-sectional, the study cannot infer 439 
empirically whether any statistically significant associations or differences between variables also 440 
are causal. Thus, causal reasoning in the study relies on theory.  441 
The development of the survey included pre-tests of a common template with pilot respondents 442 
and expert evaluations, with the overall aim of ensuring that items were clearly understandable by 443 
respondents (i.e., ensure face validity) and comparable in their meaning across translations. 444 
Targeted respondents were midlevel managers in local government organizations with 445 
responsibilities for roads and/or park services expected to have insights into operational as well as 446 
strategic dimensions of park and/or road services. By targeting responsible managers, the survey 447 
reflects a major stakeholder perspective in local government contracting and a group of 448 
professionals with key insights into how contracting processes are organized and managed. Local 449 
research partners compiled contact lists for respondents in each country through a combination of 450 
contacts with professional associations, use of phone books for professionals, inspection of websites 451 
and direct phone contacts. Due to variations in internal organization, it was in some cases necessary 452 
to identify more than one respondent or use a general contact point for a local government or a 453 
department. Initial invitations were followed up by multiple reminders for partly and non-454 
responding local governments. In a few instances where multiple respondents replied for the same 455 
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local government, a primary respondent was selected ex post based on an assessment of years of 456 
employment, job title, responsibilities, and organizational position. Data on age and employment 457 
history indicate that respondents in the final dataset are on average relatively experienced. 458 
Respondents’ average age ranged from 50 (Sweden) to 52 years (Denmark and Norway). The 459 
average employment history ranged from respectively 17 (Sweden) to 20 (Norway) years within the 460 
public sector and 10 (Sweden) to 13 (Norway) years for employment within the current local 461 
governments. Thus, due to the selection strategy and the respondents’ characteristics it is reasonable 462 
to assume that the respondents were able to provide qualified responses to survey items.   463 
The dataset includes data from 115 out of 290 local governments in Sweden (40%), 75 out of 98 464 
in Denmark (77%), and 95 out of 490 in Norway (22%). T-tests (not shown) find that the data are 465 
representative according to local government size (population) and regional distribution for 466 
Denmark and Sweden, but tend to represent larger local governments located in more central and 467 
urbanized areas in Norway. Findings from other Scandinavian research (e.g., Fongar et al. 2019) 468 
suggest that non-response in Norway and Sweden are likely to be due to high numbers of small 469 
local governments (e.g., fewer than 5,000 inhabitants) with relatively few or no responsibilities for 470 
local parks and roads. The data reported in Table 2 furthermore show that private providers are 471 
more frequently used in Denmark compared to Norway and Sweden and less frequently used within 472 
local green space/park compared to street/road services.  473 
 474 
*** Table 2 *** 475 
 476 
Measurement model  477 
The study’s measurement model includes 21 survey items. The items are used to construct and 478 
measure the study’s main dependent (performance) and independent variables. Values for five 479 
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variables based on multiple items are calculated with simple weighted averages to retain their 480 
interpretability in terms of the original response scales. In addition to survey-based items, the 481 
analysis includes three country dummy variables, a sector dummy, and a variable for local 482 
government size.  483 
The study’s dependent variables draw on four survey items that measure the respondent’s 484 
satisfaction with private provider performance in terms of criteria for service quality, price/cost 485 
levels, responsiveness toward addressing issues and deficiencies, and development and innovation 486 
of services. The study uses the items separately and in combination as an index. Items measure a 487 
respondent’s level of satisfaction on an 11-point bipolar numeric scale with the end anchors 0 = 488 
‘very unsatisfied’ and 10 = ‘very satisfied.’ Scores above (below) the scale mid-point (5) indicate 489 
greater (dis-)satisfaction with private provider performance.  490 
The study’s independent variables draw on survey items measuring competitive environment 491 
(single item), formal contract features (eight items), the overall quality of relationships with private 492 
providers (four items), and the internal contract management capacity (four items). The items are 493 
measured with an 11-point unipolar numeric scale with the end anchors 0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘in 494 
a very high degree.’  495 
The variable for competitive environment is based on a single item. The item reflects classical 496 
economic reasoning on competition (Abbott 1955) and contestability (Baumol 1982), and measures 497 
the strength of the competitive environment in which ongoing contract-based exchanges take place 498 
in terms of the relative ease of switching to an alternative. Higher scores indicate the presence of a 499 
more competitive environment. Four items for ‘standard’ and four items for ‘partnership’ features 500 
measure two key dimensions of commonly used maintenance contracts within park and road 501 
services (Lindholst 2009). Higher scores indicate a greater reliance on formal contract features for 502 
organizing and coordinating behaviors within the relationship. The variable for the (collaborative) 503 
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quality of relationship is based on four items. Item formulations reflect core content of relational 504 
governance and are adapted from earlier research (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000). Lower 505 
scores indicate more adversarial relationships while higher scores indicate the presence of more 506 
supportive collaborative relationships. The variable for contract management capacity is based on 507 
four survey items. The items reflect a generic understanding of management capacity (Ingraham et 508 
al. 2003) and refer to internal organizational features such as ‘systems,’ ‘methods,’ ‘procedures,’ 509 
‘expertise’ and ‘time’ for managing contracts. Higher scores indicate the presence of greater 510 
internal contract management capacity.  511 
The study uses a variable for local government size (number of inhabitants) as a proxy variable 512 
for urban complexity. The variable is based on register-based data (inhabitants) collected from 513 
national statistical bureaus.  514 
Finally, the study includes a control variable for service context (park or road services). Two-515 
hundred and twenty-five cases in the sample provide data for all items. Table 3 shows descriptive 516 
statistics for all included variables. Appendix A provides additional details on item formulations. 517 
 518 
*** Table 3 *** 519 
 520 
Validity checks 521 
A number of statistical ex post analyses were conducted to certify that the study relies on sound 522 
survey data and a valid measurement model. First, the data were checked for potential non-response 523 
bias based on guidelines offered by Armstrong and Overton (1977). The check tested differences in 524 
data from the groups of the early third and the late third respondents for each country with 525 
independent samples t-tests. Across 63 comparisons, the tests found no statistical significant 526 
differences at the .05 p-level and less than a handful of significant but unsystematically distributed 527 
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(i.e., for different items) differences at the .10 p-level. Based on Armstrong and Overton’s idea that 528 
late respondents resemble non-respondents, the check suggests that any substantial and systematic 529 
differences between respondents and non-respondents are unlikely to be present.  530 
Second, construct validity of the survey-based part of the measurement model was assessed with 531 
principal component analysis (PCA). PCA allows for ex post assessment of content validity, uni-532 
dimensionality, and convergent and discriminant validity of variables, i.e., the PCA checks whether 533 
items are associated with the variables that they are intended to (Heir et al. 2018). The PCA was 534 
carried out in a ‘confirmatory’ mode with the number of extracted components fixed to equal the 535 
number of survey-based variables in the measurement model (i.e., six) and with direct oblimin 536 
rotation to reflect the realistic assumption of substantial associations (i.e., correlations) between 537 
variables. The PCA shows that the six extracted components account for a satisfactory amount–538 
72%–of the total variance among the 21 survey items with the first component (performance) 539 
accounting for 32%. The PCA returns a rotated solution with high primary loadings (> .7) for all but 540 
three items (still with acceptable loadings > .4) on their expected components and no troublesome 541 
or relatively large secondary loadings (> .3) on other components. Overall, the results from the PCA 542 
are indicative of good construct validity. Reliability scores (Cronbach’s Alpha) for index-based 543 
variables ranging from .74 to .87 are indicative of good internal consistency and support the results 544 
from the PCA. Appendix A provides additional details for the PCA and reliabilities.  545 
Third, social desirability bias is likely to influence the study if local managers provided answers 546 
in accordance with personal and/or organizational interests and/or socially accepted norms. The 547 
design and administration of the survey with full anonymity should ideally reduce the risk for social 548 
desirability bias. The risk was checked ex ante in a test where a dummy variable for whether the 549 
local manager relies on in-house provision (coded ‘1’) or not (coded ‘0’)–a variable indicative of 550 
the presence of any organizational interests–is added to the study’s regression model. The test found 551 
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the estimate to be statistically insignificant (-.27, p = .221) and the inclusion did not result in any 552 
substantial change for other estimates. Thus, social desirability bias should be–if present–limited in 553 
the study.  554 
Finally, the risk for bias due to the presence of any common method variance (e.g., inflated or 555 
deflated estimates) was assessed against simulation-based guidelines offered by Fuller et al. (2016). 556 
Together, the size of reliabilities, the number of validated variables, the amount of variance 557 
explained by the first component in the PCA, and the correlations among components (ranging from 558 
.06 to .51 equal to shared variances ranging from .004 to .26) suggest that any substantial bias due 559 
to common method variance is unlikely. 560 
 561 
Results 562 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 indicate that local managers generally appear satisfied 563 
with private provider performance in terms of quality, price/costs and responsiveness of 564 
maintenance services related to local parks and roads. The average scores range from 5.8 to 7.1 on 565 
the scale, where zero equals very high dissatisfaction and ten equals very high satisfaction, and they 566 
are well above the scale midpoint of five, where scores above (below) are indicative of more (dis-567 
)satisfactory performance evaluations. One-sample t-tests (details not shown) for Scandinavia (n = 568 
225) and for each country find that all differences between the average performance scores and the 569 
scale midpoint are statistically significant (p < .01). Thus, the study finds empirical support for the 570 
hypothesis (H1) that local managers in Scandinavia on the average are more satisfied than 571 
dissatisfied with private provider performance. However, standard deviations for each performance 572 
criteria, ranging from 1.6 to 2.1, are indicative of substantial variations.  573 
 574 




Boxplots in Figure 1 illustrate these variations for each country based on the index variable for 577 
private provider performance. The main variations are rather similar in the three countries, with the 578 
majority of scores in the upper range of the scale from around 6 to 8. In Sweden and Norway, 579 
however, there are also a few deviating cases with very low scores, indicative of a more extreme 580 
dissatisfaction. In addition, the boxplots illustrate (by the lower whiskers) that a notable minority of 581 
local managers are more dissatisfied than satisfied. Clearly, market-centered models for 582 
maintenance do not work equally well for all. An additional comparison of country differences 583 
between local managers’ satisfaction with the individual performance criteria finds that differences 584 
between all scorings are insignificant except for price/costs (at p-level .01, ANOVA with post hoc 585 
test). Danish managers’ score for price/cost levels are respectively 0.90 and 0.88 higher than their 586 
Norwegian and Swedish colleagues’ scores. Overall, the substantial variations emphasize the 587 
importance of addressing the contingencies under which market-centered models work relatively 588 
well.  589 
Next, country differences and possible explanations for variations in satisfaction with private 590 
provider performance are tested through a multiple regression analysis. Table 4 shows the results 591 
from five ordinary lest square (OLS) regression models (1–5) that evaluate the importance of key 592 
contingencies for local governments’ satisfaction with private provider performance against criteria 593 
for quality, price/costs, responsiveness, innovation/development, and the aggregated performance 594 
index. All models are significant (F-tests, p < .01) and explain a substantial share of the variance in 595 
satisfaction with private provider performance with values for adjusted R2 ranging from 30% to 596 
48%. Values for variance inflation factors (VIF) are low (i.e., < 2) and indicate that multi-597 
collinearity is not a concern. A check of the main results’ robustness against a regression model 598 
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with stratified (by country) bootstrapping of standard errors, p-values, and 90% confidence intervals 599 
finds similar results (see supplementary materials).  600 
 601 
*** Table 4 *** 602 
 603 
Overall, the main results from the regression analysis shown in Table 4 corroborate most of the 604 
study’s theoretical arguments and hypotheses (H2–H8) on the importance of country context, 605 
competition, standard and partnership contract features, relationship quality, contract management 606 
capacities and urban complexities for (explaining) variations in local managers’ satisfaction with 607 
private provider’s performance of maintenance services against key criteria. Interestingly, the 608 
results differ slightly across the models for individual performance criteria (Model 2–5) and for the 609 
three countries, which provides for some nuances and unexpected results. 610 
First, there are important differences related to country context. The differences in the 611 
satisfaction with price due to the Norwegian and Swedish country context compared to the Danish 612 
are respectively -1.03 and -.67 (p < .01). The difference between the Danish and Norwegian country 613 
context is also statistically significant for quality (-.54, p < .1). In contrast to the main argument, 614 
however, the country context of Sweden is found to be positively associated with higher satisfaction 615 
with development and innovation in comparison with the Danish country context (.63, p < .01). 616 
These findings point forward to a more complex association between country context and private 617 
provider performance across different country contexts. Second, emphasis on partnership contract 618 
features is not important (p > .1) for differences in satisfaction for three out of four specific 619 
performance criteria. Still, partnership features are found to be positively associated (.20, p < .01) 620 
with their most relevant performance criterion–innovation and development of services–a criterion 621 
for which standard contract features is found to be unimportant (p > .1). Standard contract features 622 
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are positively associated with the three first performance criteria (p < .01). Third, larger local 623 
governments, compared to smaller, is associated with lower overall satisfaction (-.17, p < .05) and 624 
with regard to quality (-.29, p < .01) and responsiveness (-.18, p < .10). The logarithmic scale 625 
indicates that the association is more pronounced for differences between relatively smaller local 626 
governments.  627 
Finally, the study checks for whether the main results for the importance of contingencies are 628 
similar at the country level. For this purpose, the regression analysis in Model 1 was fitted with 629 
interaction terms between country dummies and each of the variables that test the hypothesized 630 
associations with performance (see supplemental materials). The test found that all interaction terms 631 
were statistically insignificant at p-level .10 except for standard contract features (p = .09). 632 
Subsequent analysis found that the difference between the coefficients for Sweden and Norway is 633 
statistically significant at p-level .05 and the difference between the coefficients for Denmark and 634 
Norway is close to significant at p-level .10 (p = .107) in the main analysis and statistically 635 
significant (p = .088) in the robustness check. Figure 2 illustrates further the differences and reports 636 
significance test for the country specific coefficients (simple slope tests). 637 
´ 638 
*** Figure 2 *** 639 
 640 
Overall, the results suggest that the hypothesized contingencies are not necessarily of equal 641 
importance for different performance criteria, nor do they work in accordance with general theory 642 
across different country contexts. Table 5 summarizes the empirical support for the hypothesized 643 
contingencies (H2–H8). 644 
 645 




Conclusions and Discussions 648 
Market-centered management models represent one alternative for organizing responsibilities for 649 
the maintenance of public spaces in urban environments (Carmona et al. 2008; Randrup et al. 2020; 650 
Lindholst 2009). However, past evidence, discussions in the literature and wider developments in 651 
the public sector have increasingly contested the status of market-centered models within public 652 
space management and beyond. Overall, this study finds a widespread use of private providers 653 
across local governments in Scandinavia and a majority of local managers appears satisfied–rather 654 
than dissatisfied–with private provider performance of public space maintenance. Consequently, the 655 
study’s results run counter to arguments and findings purporting a more contested status of market-656 
centered models and return some leeway to earlier pro-market arguments and policies. However, 657 
the results come with some important amendments and reservations, and raise new discussions.  658 
The study’s main results suggest that the Scandinavian countries–on the balance–have adopted a 659 
relatively successful reform approach to the use of market-centered models for public space 660 
maintenance. The approach is characterized by incrementalism and pragmatism combined with a 661 
substantial delegation of autonomy to the local government level and retention of a strong, but 662 
reformed, government bureaucracy. This contrasts more radical approaches tried out earlier in 663 
Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Jones 2000) and also reflects the idea 664 
of a widespread pragmatism (rather than ideology) among local governments in their choice of 665 
service delivery arrangements (e.g., Clifton et al. 2019; Kim and Warner 2016). The results also 666 
contribute to discussions of whether local services are witnessing a historical movement toward 667 
state-centered models after years with reforms promoting market-centered models (e.g., Wollmann 668 
et al. 2016). Although the study does not rely on longitudinal data, the findings are indicative of a 669 
strong entrenchment of market-centered models within public space management rather than a 670 
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possible movement back to state-centered models. In perspective, these findings contribute to 671 
discussions about the merits of different reform types (e.g., Christensen and Lægreid 2017) by 672 
suggesting that some segments exist in the public sector where the core ideas from the NPM work 673 
out well, and more wholesale dismissals of the NPM are thus unwarranted.  674 
The study adopts a contextualized contingency approach to the contested status of market-675 
centered models and expands on the specific contingencies for the competition prescription in the 676 
context of public space management in Scandinavia. Findings suggest that differences in 677 
competition, different types of contract features, collaborative relations, internal capacities, and 678 
urban and national contexts help explain the relative success of local governments’ use of market-679 
centered models. Thus, the study integrates and corroborates various arguments and findings from 680 
the existing literature. In particular, the study demonstrates the benefits of integrating several 681 
arguments related to national, urban and managerial contingencies. These arguments include–682 
among other–economic reasoning (e.g., Baumol 1982; Vining and Weimer 2007), contract design 683 
(e.g. Lindholst 2009; Schepker et al. 2014), sociological reasoning (e.g., Macneil 1980), 684 
administrative-organizational reasoning (e.g., Kettl 1993; 2010), arguments on the role of urban 685 
environments (De Magalhães and Carmona 2006; Warner 2006), and comparative perspectives 686 
(e.g., Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019). These arguments are furthermore expanding on the 687 
contingencies defining the circumstances under which the competition prescription performs 688 
relatively better (or worse).  689 
In a comparative perspective (e.g., Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019), the study corroborates the 690 
idea that the territorial and administrative structure in a country is important for the performance of 691 
market-centered models. The study also highlights that the importance of contingencies are likely to 692 
differ to some degree across country contexts. First, the study provides substance to the proposition 693 
that a more scattered, fragmented and unattractive market structure (represented by Norway) 694 
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moderates the effectiveness of standard contract features for managing exchange relations. This 695 
insight warrants new comparative research that evaluates whether the contingencies, such as the use 696 
of contracts, for effective use of the competition prescription work in similar or dissimilar ways 697 
across different country contexts. However, the partly unexpected and diverging results for the 698 
Swedish country context are surprising and bring attention to needs for developing contextual 699 
arguments further. One speculation is that the Swedish context is more similar to the Danish than 700 
initially argued. The findings also present a puzzle of why the Swedish context is associated with a 701 
comparatively higher satisfaction with private providers’ development and innovation of public 702 
spaces. Second, the study questions the prospect of generalizing core propositions without careful 703 
consideration of contingencies and their possible interplay within different country contexts.  704 
The study corroborates classical ideas of the importance of competition and contestability for 705 
performance of market-based exchange (e.g., Apple 1955; Baumol 1982). This result diverges in 706 
part from other studies that suggest a limited or even negative role of competition (e.g., Fernandez 707 
2009; Lamothe and Lamothe 2010). The divergence brings attention to the different ways local 708 
governments can harness competition for improving performance. This study suggests that a 709 
competitive environment that allows for less burdensome provider shifts in case of failure–in 710 
contrast to a routine use of competitive tendering that may upset existing well-performing exchange 711 
relations–is important for better performance.  712 
The literature highlights that formal contracts can be designed differently, allocate risks in 713 
different ways and serve multiple functions and purposes within an exchange-relation (e.g., 714 
Lindholst 2009; Marques and Berg 2011; Schepker et al. 2014; Vincent-Jones 2007). This study 715 
contributes with empirical insights on the importance of formal contracts for performance and how 716 
different contract dimensions work within exchange relations. One interpretation of the results for 717 
the relative importance of respectively standard and partnership features for different performance 718 
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criteria is that they are able to serve different purposes depending on local governments’ wider 719 
strategic objectives. Reliance on standard features appears to serve objectives related to technical 720 
efficiency (quality and price/costs), while partnership features serve objectives related to allocative 721 
efficiency (development and innovation). Thus the study provides some empirical support for hopes 722 
raised for partnership-based approaches in the literature (e.g., Dempsey and Burton 2012; Jones 723 
2000; Vincent-Jones 2007). However, one limitation of this study for the judgment of partnership-724 
based approaches is that these often encompass broader strategic and social objectives beyond the 725 
four performance criteria adopted in this study (e.g., Dempsey et al. 2020). In addition, the support 726 
for the importance of formal partnership features can be discussed in conjunction with the support 727 
for the importance of the collaborative quality of relations, as partnership-based models are 728 
commonly defined as a collaborative endeavor (e.g., Donahue and Zeckhauser 2012). In this 729 
respect, the study shows that the informal side of partnerships–a working relationship based on a 730 
collaborative spirit–is a key contingency. Relevant to this discussion, the descriptive statistics (see 731 
Table 2) show that reliance on partnership contract features appears relatively low compared to the 732 
level of collaborative quality of relations and the reliance on standard contract features. This is 733 
indicative of an overall complementary approach in Scandinavia, where a strong reliance on 734 
standard contract features is embedded within exchange relations characterized by a collaborative 735 
spirit. Thus the reliance on standard contract features in Scandinavia appears to be embedded in 736 
exchange relations where there is less need for the contract’s function as a safeguard, and where the 737 
contract’s primary function can be expected to be related to planning and coordination of activities. 738 
The study’s findings for the importance of a collaborative quality of relationships for performance 739 
are furthermore congruent with sociological theories of contracts (e.g., Macneil 1980; Vincent-740 
Jones 2000) and findings in earlier research (e.g., Amirkhanyan et al. 2010; Fernandez 2009). The 741 
findings for Norway–where reliance on standard contract features appears unimportant for 742 
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satisfaction with private provider performance–is a more extreme illustration of the relevance of 743 
sociological arguments.   744 
The study corroborates arguments in the literature that emphasize the importance of contract 745 
management capacity (e.g., Amirkhanyan et al. 2014; Kettl 1993; 2010; Van Slyke 2003). Thus the 746 
study further validates the importance of administrative-organizational contingencies. The study, 747 
however, draws on a generic concept of management competency and it would be of interest to 748 
explore further which particular managerial instruments (i.e., contingencies) competent managers 749 
rely upon for ensuring the performance of private providers.  750 
Finally, the study finds empirical support for a negative association between local government 751 
size–as a measure for urban complexity–and satisfaction with private providers’ performance. Thus, 752 
the study supports the literature (e.g., Warner 2006) suggesting that urban complexities are 753 
detrimental to the performance of market-centered models. It would be of interest to explore further 754 
whether some models, such as partnerships (e.g., Dempsey and Burton 2012; Donahue and 755 
Zeckhauser 2012), are better suited to mitigating the challenges of more complex urban 756 
environments.  757 
The study’s findings offer guidance on how local governments can improve their returns from 758 
adopting market-centered models for organizing maintenance of public spaces. From a managerial 759 
perspective, the empirical support for the focal contingencies indicates prospective areas for 760 
development of managerial skills and the importance of investing in internal capacities. Rather than 761 
shifting to other alternatives, local governments could assess local circumstances and address key 762 
contingencies that determine the relative outcomes of using different types of market-centered 763 




Limitations and future research 766 
The number of available cases for analysis limits the study’s statistical power in some parts. In 767 
particular, the lower n for Norway (56 cases) increases the risk of missing smaller but still 768 
substantial effects (i.e., type II errors). Thus, studies with higher n for subgroups are required to 769 
detect whether smaller effects are present and provide more certainty for empirical support.  770 
The study relies on perceptual data from a single stakeholder to measure otherwise hard to 771 
measure variables and enable country comparison. One critique is that perceptual data are likely to 772 
be prone to several biases, and their validity relies critically on sound application of methods in 773 
particular in a study’s design phase and the alignment of a study’s purpose with respondents’ 774 
interest and competencies (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff, 2012). However, it is important 775 
to note that perceptions–such as managers’ satisfaction with price and quality–inform local 776 
government decisions about who provides local services (e.g., Warner and Aldag 2019). Thus, 777 
gauging the perceptions of local managers is key for understanding dynamics in how service 778 
provision is organized. The perceptions of other key stakeholders, e.g., citizens, politicians and 779 
experts, are equally relevant in complementary accounts. Similarly, other sources, e.g., register-780 
based accounts, might return different or complementary results (e.g., Amirkhanyan, Hyun, and 781 
Lambright 2014), and these are likely to be more valid for some research (e.g., comparisons of in-782 
house and private providers) where social desirability bias can be expected to be more influential or 783 
the respondents’ yardstick for assessment differs (e.g., Andrews et al. 2010). 784 
The study takes place in the specific context of public space maintenance and findings may–with 785 
some caution–be extended to other services with similar characteristics, e.g., relative ease of 786 
specification and monitoring. Whether the study’s findings are generalizable to services with more 787 
dissimilar characteristics is speculative. However, the study relies and expands on theoretical 788 
arguments that are more parsimonious and finds empirical support for these within the context of 789 
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public space maintenance services in Scandinavia. Thus the study provides a contextualized 790 
empirical validation of and extension to existing arguments on the contingencies for the competition 791 
prescription (e.g., Amirkhanyan et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2006; Dehoog 1990).  792 
In perspective, the study highlights several avenues for future research. Notably, the study 793 
warrants a contingency perspective on the performance of market-centered models corresponding to 794 
multiple national, managerial, and urban conditions and contextual characteristics. This also 795 
supports general calls for understanding organizational choices in regional governance by directing 796 
attention to context (Feiock 2007). The study highlights the prospects for advancing research by 797 
exploring the importance of country context further. One option would be to undertake replications 798 
to validate performance and contingencies within similar or dissimilar service and/or country 799 
contexts. The choice of dissimilar legal-institutional contexts with similar territorial and 800 
administrative structures could test the importance of neo-institutional arguments (e.g., Williamson 801 
2000) on the importance of “higher-order” institutions (e.g., legal frameworks) or different 802 
“administrative traditions” (e.g., Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019) for the effectiveness of lower-803 
order institutions (e.g., contract-based exchange) and the performance of different market-centered 804 
models. Overall, the study highlights the relevance of context-sensitive scrutiny of the performance 805 
of different types of market-centered models and careful generalization and application of theory 806 
and arguments across country contexts.  807 
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Table 1. Country characteristics (mid 2010s) 
 Denmark Norway Sweden 
Government system Consensual Consensual Consensual 
Local autonomy High High High 






Number of local governments (lower tier) 98 428 290 
Country size (km2) 43,000 407.000 304,000 
Country size (inhabitants in thousands) 5,729 5,236 9,923 
Average inhabitants in local governments 58,000 12,000 34,000 
Inhabitants per km2 134 14 23 
Sources: OECD (2018), Greve, Lægreid, and Rykkja (2016), Ladner, Keuffer, and Baldersheim (2016), and Lijphart 
(2012). 




Table 2.  Country differences in local use of private providers 





Proportions using private 
providers to some degree (> 0%) 
Green space/parks 80% N S 36% DK 45% DK 
Street/roads 93% S  85% (S) 73% DK (N) 
Notes: Table based on survey data 2014-2016 (including cases that do not contract out). Remaining proportions are 
mainly provided by an in-house provider within the local government except for Sweden where about 10% of local 
governments use an inter-municipal company. Country comparisons based on pairwise χ2-tests. Significant statistical 
results reported with country codes, e.g., N, for p <.05, and codes in parentheses, e.g., (N) p <.1.  
  1039 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean a SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance       
  Index 6.6 1.6 0.3 10.0 -0.70 1.05 
  Quality  7.1 1.7 0.0 10.0 -1.14 2.47 
  Price/costs  6.8 1.9 0.0 10.0 -0.65 0.78 
  Responsiveness  6.7 1.9 0.0 10.0 -0.73 0.64 
  Innovation / development 5.8 2.1 0.0 10.0 -0.24 -0.20 
Country context (dummies)       
  Denmark (yes = 1) 39% N/A 0 1 N/A N/A 
  Norway (yes = 1) 25% N/A 0 1 N/A N/A 
  Sweden (yes = 1) 36% N/A 0 1 N/A N/A 
Competitive environment 6.1 2.6 0.0 10.0 -0.44 -0.73 
Standard contract features  7.1 2.3 0.0 10.0 -0.83 0.10 
Partnership contract features 4.6 2.1 0.0 10.0 0.09 -0.31 
Collaborative relationship 7.5 1.6 2.3 10.0 -0.67 0.00 
Contract mgmt. capacity 6.3 2.0 0.8 10.0 -0.64 -0.10 
Local government size (LN) b 10.26 1.24 7.08 13.38 -0.26 0.27 
Service context (parks = 0, roads = 1) 63% N/A 0 1 N/A N/A 
Note: N=225.  
a For dummy variables, the percentage for the value of 1 is presented. 
b Data from national statistical bureaus (2016).   
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Table 4. OLS regression analysis of private provider performance (unstandardized beta-coefficients, standard errors 
and p-levels) 
 Model 1  
Index 
Model 2  
Quality 








Country dummies (DK = ref.)      
  Norway (yes = 1) -.46(.25)* -.54(.28)* -1.02(.32)*** -.09(.32) -.20(.37) 
  Sweden (yes = 1) -.03(.19) -.17(.21) -.67(.24)*** .36(.25) .63(.39)** 
Competitive environment .06(.03)* .06(.04)* .08(.04)** .09(.04)** .01(.07)  
Standard contract features  .14(.04)*** .17(.05)*** .19(.06)*** .17(.06)*** .02(.06) 
Partnership contract features -.04(.05) -.01(.05) -.01(.06) -.04(.06) .20(.07)*** 
Collaborative relationship .47(.05)*** .49(.06)*** .37(.07)*** .51(.07)*** .52(.08)*** 
Contract mgmt. capacity .18(.04)*** .20(.05)*** .18(.06)*** .20(.06)*** .16(.07)** 
Local government size (LN) b -.17(.08)** -.29(.09)*** - .06(.10) -.18(.10)* -.16(.12) 
Service dummy (parks = 0, roads = 1) .19(.16) .14(.18) .29(.21) .19(.21) .15(.25) 
Model summary      
Model constant 2.16(.90)*** 3.80(1.00)*** 2.00(1.16)* 1.75(1.17) 1.08(1.36) 
F-test 22.70*** 19.67*** 13.92*** 15.30*** 11.52*** 
R2 / Adj. R2 .49 / .47 .45 / .43 .36 / .34 .39 / .37 .33 / .30 
Notes: N=225.  P-levels * ≤ .1, ** ≤ .05, *** ≤ .01. Max value for variance inflation factors (VIF) is 1.88 in all models 
and relates to country dummies.  



















H2 (Danish context 
more supportive)  




Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
H4 (standard 
contract) 
Partial Yes Yes Yes No  
H5 (partnership 
contract) 
No No No No Yes 
H6  (collaborative 
relationship) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H7 (contract mgmt. 
capacity) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
H8 (urban 
environment) 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
Note: Evidence evaluated at p-level .10.  
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Figure 1. Boxplots of managers’ satisfaction with private providers’ performance of public space maintenance in three 
Scandinavian countries. Notes: N=225. Satisfaction with performance measured on an eleven-point numeric response scale where 
‘0’ = very dissatisfied and ‘10’ = very satisfied. Average scores marked by a cross. 
 1047 






Figure 2. Estimated country moderation of the association between standard contract features and performance. 
Notes: N=225.  P-levels * ≤ .1, ** ≤ .05, *** ≤ .01. Model summary R2 = .50, F(11, 213)= 19.25***. Significance 
test of interaction term for country and standard contract features (mean centered): F(2, 213)= 2.39, p = .09. ΔR2 = 
.011. Differences at increasing levels of standard contract features probed at the 16th (low), 50th (median) and 84th 
(high) percentile: Statistically significant differences found for DK-Norway at the median (-.51**) and high level (-
.84**) and for Sweden-Norway at the median (-.56**) and high level (-.97***).  
 1050 
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Appendix A  1052 
Appendix A: Principal component analysis (PCA): Survey items and loadings 
 Loadings 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 Com. 
Performance (Alpha = .862)        
 Overall quality of maintenance operations .760      .771 
 General pricing and cost of provided services  .717      .653 
 Follow-up and responsiveness toward service issues .899      .835 
 Innovation and development of services  .827      .713 
Competition         
 Can change provider without significant costs / interruptions      .925 .879 
Standard contract features (Alpha = .850)        
 Formalized and written conditions and clauses (§§)  .846     .703 
 Performance specifications (goals, functionality and guidelines)   .657     .674 
 Prescriptive specifications (quantities, instructions and standards)   .813     .677 
 Formal and financial sanctions for noncompliance.  .731     .765 
Partnership contract features (Alpha = .738)        
 Formal model for collaboration and joint planning.    .727   .716 
 Engagement with users    .667   .548 
 Economic incentives for optimizing services    .801   .665 
 Skill requirements and professional qualifications    .463   .488 
Relation quality (Alpha = .858)        
 Mutual belief in collaboration as necessary for goal attainment     .902  .845 
 Mutual preparedness for change to make work easier     .874  .810 
 Mutual concerns for goal attainment      .786  767 
 Mutual belief in problem-solving as a joint responsibility      .700  .654 
Contract mgmt. capacity (Alpha = .867)        
 Organizational resources (e.g., time and staff)   .872    .711 
 Experience and expertise   .754    .689 
 Methods and systems   .853    .767 
 Management practices and procedures   .849    .839 
Eigenvalue 6.7 2.8 2.4 1.3 1.1 .9  
Explained variance (%) 31.9 13.1 11.2 6.3 5.2 4.5  
Notes: N = 225. Abbreviated and translated item formulations. PCA carried out with direct oblimin rotation and 
forced extraction of six components (solution converged in 9 iterations). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy = .845. Barlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(210) = 2575, p <. 001. Total inter-item variance explained = 72.2%. 
Loadings shown for rotated solution, loadings < .3 not shown. Cronbach’s Alpha (reliability) scores calculated with 
items for each index based variables. Extracted communalities (com.) reported in last column.  
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